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We examine the effects of Canada’s Special Milk Classes Scheme on resource 
allocation and discuss the rationale for average total cost of production as a measure 
of payments. Our simple model divides the total supply of fluid milk into two classes: 
one for domestic consumption and the other for export. First we show that the 
regulated high price of milk sold for domestic consumption does not yield cross 
subsidization if the processed milk for export is traded freely in the international 
market. In addition, the price of milk processed and sold for export may not be lower 
than the average total cost in some cases. It implies that the average total cost 
standard does not necessarily provide the proper measure of the subsidy.   
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1. Introduction 
Dairy products and their processed goods are under government control in many 
countries. One example is Canada’s Special Milk Classes Scheme introduced in 1995. It 
established five different milk classes, which include four classes of milk for the 
domestic market and the fifth class for milk sold to processors who export their 
products. The Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) regulates milk prices but the 
exporters/processors are required to negotiate the prices of milk with the CDC. Later 
Canada introduced a new class called “commercial export milk or cream (CEM)”. Milk 
under this class is traded without any government intervention, but must not be sold for 
domestic consumption nor be processed for domestic sales. The scheme makes the price 
of milk sold to processors who export their products lower than the regulated price of 
milk sold for domestic consumption or production of processed goods sold in the 
domestic market.   
The United States and New Zealand challenged Canada’s Scheme at the WTO, 
claiming that it provided export subsidies in violation with the Agreement on 
Agriculture. The Appellate Body (AB) of the WTO is in favor of an “objective standard 
or benchmark which reflects the proper value of goods or services”. The AB proposed 
the average total cost as such a standard or benchmark. That is, the identification of 
export subsidies must be based on the comparison between the price of milk paid by the 
processors/exporters and the average total cost of milk production.
1 
     Janow  and  Staiger  (2001)  criticized  the  use of the average total cost as a standard 
or benchmark. In a very simple partial equilibrium model, they found that the 
consumption tax on the milk sold for domestic consumption generates the same 
resource allocation as the special milk classes scheme. Under the average total cost 
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standard, however, the special milk classes scheme is judged as export subsidy but the 
consumption tax is not. So they did not find an economic rationality for the average 
total cost standard.   
In this paper we reexamine whether the milk class scheme makes the price of 
milk sold for exports lower than the average total cost, and derive the various effects the 
scheme has. We incorporate milk and cheese industries in a simple model. The price and 
supply of milk in the domestic market are controlled by the government and the 
“excess” milk is exported to foreign countries.
2 
We find that the scheme generates a gap between the regulated price of milk sold 
for domestic consumption and the price of milk sold for exports if there is a trade 
restriction on imports of cheese. If the scheme reduces the price of milk sold for exports, 
then cross subsidization will occur and the scheme has a similar effect as an export 
subsidy. But this may not happen in the extreme cases, and we may not identify the 
cross subsidization. In addition, if we incorporate heterogeneous domestic dairy farmers, 
the price of milk sold for exports is higher than the average total cost even if the 
government introduces the scheme. 
Our model extends Janow and Staiger’s analysis and distinguishes between milk 
producers (dairy farmers) and processors/exporters (cheese producers). We show that 
the productivity of the processors/exporters plays an important role in explaining the 
price gap between the milk sold for domestic consumption and that sold for exports. In 
the case of heterogeneous dairy farmers, we find that cross subsidization may not occur 
and the average total cost standard may not identify a price gap.   
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic model 
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which incorporate milk and cheese producers. In section 3 we consider the competitive 
equilibrium without the special milk classes scheme. Section 4 derives its effects on 
resource allocation. Section 5 shows the relationship between the average total cost and 
the price of milk sold for exports. Section 6 introduces heterogeneous milk producers. 
The final section gives concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The Basic Model 
There are two countries: home (“Canada”) and foreign (“the U.S.”). In the home 
country, dairy farmers produce dairy products (“Milk”) and sell to producers of 
processed dairy products (“Cheese”) export. The dairy products are sold only in the 
domestic market and are not imported from the foreign country due to some trade 
barriers. The processed dairy products are consumed in the domestic market and also 
exported to the foreign country. 
We denote the price of milk for domestic use as  p  and that for export as  q. The 
price of milk in the Home country must be identical without any government 
intervention in a competitive market regardless of usage, i.e., the milk used to make 
cheese to be exported must be priced equally to that used for other domestic purposes. 
However, in the Canadian case, the milk market is not competitive. In fact, the 
government controls the price and supply of the milk for domestic use, and the surplus 
milk is supplied to the producers of exported cheese under the Canada’s Special Milk 
Classes Scheme. As a consequence, the price of milk processed for domestic 
consumption may be different from the price of milk processed for export.   
The dairy farmers in the home country produce milk. The total cost function of 
milk is  () S CQ  where  S Q  is the total output of milk in the home country. We assume 5 
 
that the cost function is non-decreasing in  S Q . The technology of milk production 
exhibits increasing returns to scale if the average cost is decreasing in  Q, decreasing 
returns to scale if it is increasing in  Q  , and constant returns to scale if it is constant in 
Q.  
On the other hand, the production function of cheese is  () hQ with 
'( ) ( ) / 0 hQ d h Q d Q    and  "( ) '( )/ 0 hQ d h Q d Q   . If  " h   approaches zero,  ' h  
becomes constant and one unit of cheese production requires  1/ ' h   unit of milk.   
The domestic demand for cheese in the home country is  () Dr, where  r  is the 
domestic price of cheese and  '( ) ( ) / 0 Dr d D r d r   . The foreign country imports 
cheese from the home country. We denote the foreign import demand function as  () Fw 
where  w  is the world price of cheese and  '( ) ( )/ 0 Fw d F w d w   . 
 
2.1   The Benchmark Case 
Let us consider the benchmark case where the government of the home country 
does not intervene in the milk market. We also assume that the domestic and the world 
markets of cheese are perfectly competitive. Then, the price of milk processed for 
export must equal the one for domestic use, i.e.,  qp  . In addition, the domestic price 
of cheese must equal the world price of cheese, i.e.,  rw  . 
The cheese producers in the home country maximize their profits 
() wh Q qQ   . The profit maximization condition gives the demand for milk which 
satisfies  '( ) wh Q q  . We can denote the milk demand function as  (, ) Qqw, where 
/1 / " 0 q QQ qw h      and  /' / " 0 w QQ w h w h     . We also have  ' wq Qh Q  . 
Here we can define the price elasticity of milk demand as  (/ ) Qq qQ Q    . When  " h  6 
 
approaches zero or  ' h  becomes constant, then  Q   approaches infinity. On the other 
hand if  " h   approaches infinity, then  Q    becomes zero. The supply function of cheese 
i s  (, ) ((, ) ) Z qw hQqw  . An increase in the world price of cheese increases the amount 
of cheese supply, i.e., 
2 /'( ' ) 0 ww q ZZ w h Q h Q      . On the other hand, an 
increase in the milk price will reduce the supply of cheese, i.e., 
/' 0 qq ZZ q h Q     . 
The milk producers in the home country maximize their profits under the 
domestic competitive market. The price of milk must be equal to the marginal cost of 
milk production. The supply function of milk,  () Sq, is derived from the condition that 
'() S qC Q  . 
The equilibrium prices of cheese and milk are determined from the market 
clearing conditions in their respective markets. The total demand for cheese consists of 
the domestic demand and the foreign import demand. Therefore the market clearing 
condition for cheese is  ( ) ( ) ( , ) Dw Fw Zqw  . We also define the export supply 
function of cheese as  ( , ) ( , ) ( ) Eqw Zqw Dw   where  '0 ww EZD   and 
0 qq EZ  . The export supply function is increasing in the world price of cheese, and 
an increase in the milk price reduces the export supply. Then, the equilibrium condition 
for cheese can be expressed as  ( , ) ( ) Eqw Fw  . On the other hand, we must have 
(, ) () Qqw Sq    for the milk market in equilibrium. 
From the market clearing condition for cheese, we obtain the world price which 
















where  (/) Fw wFF    is the price elasticity of foreign import demand function and 
(/ ) Dr rD D    is the price elasticity of domestic cheese demand function. It shows 
that / 0 dw dq   when  F   or  0 Q   . 
     Substituting  ( ) wq   into the market clearing condition of milk, we have 
(, () ) () Qqwq Sq  . This condition yields the equilibrium milk price. The slope of the 
milk demand curve is 
 









The first term shows the direct effect of the milk price on the demand for milk. As the 
milk price increases, the demand for milk will decrease. The second term shows the 
indirect effect which appears as the world price of cheese changes. An increase in the 
milk price increases the world price of cheese. Then, the domestic cheese producers try 
to increase the supply of cheese, which leads to an increase in the milk demand. 
Although there are two opposite effects, we obtain 
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Thus, the demand curve for milk is non-increasing in its price. As the supply curve is 
non-decreasing in the milk price, the market clearing condition gives us the equilibrium 
price of milk. 
Let us denote the equilibrium price and supply of milk without government 
intervention as  0 q  and  0 Q , respectively. The equilibrium price of milk is equal to the 
marginal cost of the dairy farmers. If entry or exit is free in the milk market, the excess 
profit must disappear in the long-run equilibrium. Then, the milk price equals the 
minimum total average cost of the dairy farmers. We denote the average cost function as 
() () / SS S ACQ CQ Q  , we have  00 () qA C Q  . 
 
3.  The Milk Special Classes Scheme 
     Now suppose that the government of the home country introduces price and 
supply control over the milk processed for domestic consumption of cheese, and the 
“excess” milk is supplied at the competitive market price for the cheese producers who 
export cheese. Let us denote the regulated price of milk for processors (cheese 
producers) for domestic sales as  1 p . The government also controls the supply of milk 
for them at  1 x . 
     We assume that the cheese producers are required to input the milk sold for 
domestic consumption first. Then, the amount of cheese supplied in the domestic market 
is  1 () hx . The equilibrium price of cheese in the domestic market is determined so that 
the equilibrium condition  1 () ( ) hx Dr   is satisfied. The domestic cheese price is 9 
 
expressed as a function of  1 x  and  11 1 /' ( ) // ' dr dx h x D h D     . The consumption of 
cheese in the home country is given by  1 (( ) ) Drx . 
     The government sets  the price of milk sold for domestic consumption. The profit 
of cheese production is expressed as 
 
      11 1 1 1 1 () { ( ) () }( ) rh x w h x y h x p x qy           ( 1 )  
 
where  y  is the amount of milk processed for exports of cheese or “excess” milk.
3 The 
first and second terms are the revenue from the domestic and foreign cheese sales, 
respectively, and the third term is the total cost. Maximizing the profits with respect to 
1 x , we obtain the inverse demand of the milk sold for domestic consumption:
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      11 1 1 '( ) { '( ) '( )} p rh x w h x y h x         ( 2 )  
 
Here we assume that cheese producers regard the prices of milk and cheese and the 
amount of milk sold for exports of cheese constant. The first term shows the marginal 
benefits from the domestic market. The second term is the marginal loss in the foreign 
market since the marginal supply of cheese in the foreign market decreases as  1 x  
increases. The government is assumed to set the price following equation (2). 
          We can derive the gap between the milk price sold for domestic consumption and 
the one for exports. As we see later, the marginal revenue of the milk sold for exports 
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will be the same as its marginal cost, i.e. the price of milk sold for exports: 
1 '( ) wh x y q    (eq.(4)) . Arranging equation (2), we obtain 
 
      11 () ' ( ) p qr w h x          ( 3 )  
 
We obtain two important implications on the milk price gap from equation (3). 
First, the price of milk sold for exports must be lower than the regulated milk price if 
the domestic cheese price is higher than its world price. The gap between the regulated 
price and the price of milk sold for domestic consumption is not generated only by the 
scheme. Some form of trade barriers in the cheese markets may be essential to the milk 
price gap. If the domestic and foreign markets for cheese are integrated and there is no 
trade barrier, i.e.,  rw  , the regulated price must be equal to the price of milk sold for 
domestic consumption. Secondly, equation (3) implies that the rate of shifting from the 
cheese price gap to the milk price gap becomes smaller as  1 x  increases when  "0 h  , 
or as the productivity of cheese becomes lower.   
     The  profit  maximization  condition  for  cheese producers with respect to milk sold 
for exports is 
 
      1 '( ) wh x y q            ( 4 )  
 
We have the total demand for milk from (4):  1 (, ) Qqw x y   . The demand for milk 
sold for cheese exports is  1 (, ) yQ q w x  . The total supply of cheese is given by 11 
 
(, ) ( (, ) ) Z qw hQqw  . 
     The  market  clearing  condition  for  cheese  is 
 
      1 (, ) (( ) ) () Z qw Drx Fw         ( 5 )  
 
From equation (5), we have the equilibrium world price of cheese as a function of  q 
and  1 x . Let us denote the solution function as  1 (, ) wqx . Totally differentiating (5) gives 
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      ( 7 )  
 
An increase in the price of milk sold for exports reduces the supply of cheese. It 
increases the world price of cheese as is shown in equation (6). On the other hand, a 
reduction in the supply of milk sold for domestic consumption will increase the 
domestic cheese price and reduce the domestic consumption of cheese. It increases the 
export supply of cheese and reduces the world price of cheese. 
The market clearing condition for milk sold for exports as  1 ySx    or 
 
      (, ) () Qqw Sq          ( 8 )  
 12 
 
Substituting  1 (, ) wqx   into the market clearing condition of milk, we have 
 
      1 (, (, ) ) () Qqwqx Sq         ( 9 )  
 
From this condition, we obtain the equilibrium price of milk sold for exports,  11 () qx q  . 
A change in the price of milk sold for exports has the following effect on the demand 
for milk. 
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         ( 1 1 )  
 
From (10) we observe that the demand curve has a negative slope if  F   and  Q   are 
positive. Therefore we can find the unique equilibrium price of milk sold for exports if 
its supply curve is increasing in the output, i.e.,  / 0 Sd S d q    . 
The effect of a reduction in the supply of milk for the domestic use on the milk 
price for exports is given by 
 







dx S dQ dq

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       ( 1 2 )  
 
If the government forces dairy farmers to reduce milk supply sold for domestic 13 
 
consumption, the price of milk sold for exports will fall except for some cases.   
First, from (7), the world price of cheese does not change when  F   approaches 
infinity even if the government reduces the supply of milk sold for domestic 
consumption. When F   is infinity, the foreign import demand curve becomes a 
horizontal line. It implies that they can import any volume of cheese at the constant 
world price (i.e., the home country can be considered a small open economy). Therefore, 
the introduction of this scheme has no effect on the world price of cheese and the price 
of milk sold for exports.   
Secondly the price of milk sold for exports does not change if  Q  =0. Since 
' wq Qh Q   , we know that the total supply curve of cheese becomes a vertical line. A 
reduction in the supply of milk sold for domestic consumption will increase the export 
supply of cheese and the world price of cheese will decrease. But the total supply curve 
of cheese is insensitive to the cheese price, its total supply will not change. Then the 
total demand for milk will be the same amount and the price of milk sold for exports 
will not change. A reduction in the supply of milk sold for domestic consumption will 
be completely offset by an increase in the supply of milk sold for exports. 
Finally the equilibrium world price of cheese is expressed as  11 1 (,) wq x w   and 
the total supply of milk is  11 1 11 (,(,) ) () Qq wq x Sq Q   . The amount of milk sold for 
exports is given by  11 1 y Qx  . 
 
4.  The Average Cost and the Price of Milk Sold for Exports 
     In  this  section  we  will  discuss  the  relationship between the average total cost and 14 
 
the price of milk sold for exports. Let us consider conditions under which the price of 
milk sold for exports becomes lower than the total average cost. Introduction of the 
scheme may change the equilibrium price of milk sold for exports as shown by (12). It 
also changes the average total cost which depends on the total output of milk. The 
average total cost can be expressed as  1 ((() ) ) ACSqx . From this definition, a change in 
the average total cost would be 
 
      11 /' ' ( / ) dAC dx AC S dq dx         ( 1 3 )  
 
In order to identify the conditions we define the difference between the milk price for 
exports and the average total cost. 
 
      11 1 () (( () ) () x AC S q x q x          ( 1 4 )  
 
Totally differentiating this equation, we obtain 
 
      11 /( ' ' 1 ) ( / ) dd x A C S d q dx          ( 1 5 )  
 
     If there is no government intervention initially, q equals the average total cost. 
The price of milk sold for exports becomes lower than the average total cost as the 
government reduces the supply of milk sold for domestic consumption if  1 /0 dd x   . 
This case appears when the average total cost is U-shaped.   15 
 
 
In Figure 1, S is the total supply curve (or the marginal cost curve) and AC is the 
total average cost curve. The initial price of milk is given by  0 q   and the initial total 
supply of milk is  0 Q . The total average cost equals the price of milk. Suppose that an 
introduction of the scheme reduces the price of milk sold for exports to  1 q   and the total 
supply of milk to  1 Q . Then the average total cost increases from  0 q  to  1 AC . The 
price of milk sold for domestic consumption becomes lower than the average total cost. 
In order for the domestic dairy farmers to keep a positive production, the regulated price 
must be higher than the average total cost, implying that cross subsidization occurs 
under the scheme. Transferring the positive profit obtained from sales of milk sold for 
domestic consumption, the milk producers supply the milk sold for exports at a price 
lower than the average total cost. This scheme has the similar effects as an export 










     The  cross  subsidization  may  not  occur  in some special cases. As we discuss in the 
last section, the price of milk sold for exports does not change if (i) the home country is 
a small open economy or (ii) the demand curve for milk is vertical. Then the milk 
producers keep the same total amount of milk supply. In this case the average total cost 
equals the initial average cost and the price of milk sold for exports. 
 
5.  Heterogeneous Dairy Farmers 
     We assume so far that there are homogeneous domestic dairy farmers and 
homogeneous cheese producers in the home country. In this section we introduce 
heterogeneous milk producers. The technology of each firm is constant returns to scale 
so that the average and marginal costs are identical and constant in the output. For 
simplicity, we assume that each producer can produce one unit of milk because of 
capacity limits. (Marginal cost becomes too large beyond one unit of output.) Without 
loss of generality, we can assume that the average and marginal cost of the i-th producer 
is equal to i+f,  where f is the average and marginal cost of the most efficient milk 
producer. In this case we have to make a distinction between the average cost of each 
firm and the average total cost in the industry level. 
Then the supply curve of the home country becomes  ( ) Sq q f   . As we see in 
the benchmark case (Section 2), the equilibrium price of milk is determined so that 
(, () ) () Qqwq Sq   is satisfied. The equilibrium price is  0 q , which equals the marginal 
cost of the least efficient firm. The number of producers in the market will be  0 qf  , 
which equals the total supply of milk. Then the total cost in the milk industry is   
 17 
 









TC x f dx
 
         ( 1 6 )  
 
The average total cost in the industry level is 
 
      0 () / 2 AC q f          ( 1 7 )  
 
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium price and the average total cost in the industry level. 




          Now suppose that the government introduces the milk class scheme. We still keep 
the same assumptions regarding the cheese producers. Therefore, the equilibrium price 
S 
AC,q 
0 q  







of milk sold for exports is determined so that equation (9),  1 (, (, ) ) () Qqwqx Sq  , is 
satisfied. If we denote the equilibrium price of milk sold for exports as  1 q , then 
equilibrium total supply of milk will be  1 qf  . Since the average total cost of dairy 
farmers is  1 () / 2 qf  , the price of milk sold for exports is higher than the average total 
cost even if the government introduces the milk class scheme. 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have derived the effects of the milk classes scheme introduced by 
the Canadian government and have examined the rationality of the average total cost 
standard. The scheme generates a gap between the price of milk sold for domestic 
consumption and the one for exports, but the average total cost may or may not be lower 
than the price of milk sold for exports. 
We have introduced milk and cheese producers separately but we have not 
considered the following feature of the industries. First, as is noted in the footnote, it 
may be more appropriate to use the pool price for milk to be exported. Introduction of 
the monopolistic State Trading Enterprise and the pool price system, we can also 
explain the price gap between the milk sold for domestic consumption and the one for 
exports. With the pool price, the price of milk for exports will be higher than the 
marginal cost of exporters, and we may obtain additional results on resource allocation. 
Secondly, we have not dealt with imperfectly competitive markets of milk or cheese. If 
the importers in a foreign country have market power, they can set a lower price to 
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